TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynastic politicians
T2 - Theory and evidence from Japan
AU - Asako, Yasushi
AU - Iida, Takeshi
AU - Matsubayashi, Tetsuya
AU - Ueda, Michiko
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Cambridge University Press 2015.
PY - 2015/2/10
Y1 - 2015/2/10
N2 - Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts, despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.
AB - Dynastic politicians, defined as those whose family members have also served in the same position in the past, occupy a sizable portion of offices in many parts of the world. We develop a model of how dynastic politicians with inherited political advantages affect electoral outcomes and policy choices. Our model predicts that, as compared with non-dynastic legislators, dynastic legislators bring more distributions to the district, enjoy higher electoral success, and harm the economic performance of the districts, despite the larger amount of distributive benefits they bring. We test the implications of the model using data from Japan between 1997 and 2007.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84922589328&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84922589328&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S146810991400036X
DO - 10.1017/S146810991400036X
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84922589328
SN - 1468-1099
VL - 16
SP - 5
EP - 32
JO - Japanese Journal of Political Science
JF - Japanese Journal of Political Science
IS - 1
ER -