Does skin in the game matter? Director incentives and governance in the mutual fund industry

Martijn Cremers, Joost Driessen, Pascal Maenhout, David Weinbaum

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

33 Scopus citations

Abstract

We use a unique database on ownership stakes of equity mutual fund directors to analyze whether the directors incentive structure is related to fund performance. Ownership of both independent and nonindependent directors plays an economically and statistically significant role. Funds in which directors have low ownership, or skin in the game, significantly underperform. We posit two economic mechanisms to explain this relation. First, lack of ownership could indicate a directors lack of alignment with fund shareholder interests. Second, directors may have superior private information on future performance. We find evidence in support of the first and against the second mechanism.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1345-1373
Number of pages29
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume44
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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