TY - JOUR
T1 - Division rules and migration equilibria
AU - Gensemer, Susan
AU - Hong, Lu
AU - Kelly, Jerry S.
PY - 1996/4
Y1 - 1996/4
N2 - Fair division rules are examined in a framework consisting of local environments with fixed, non-disposable, perfectly divisible endowments, and (possibly) different division rules. Individuals have single-peaked preferences and are free to choose the environments where they live. Given that the rules satisfy various desirable properties such as efficiency, strategy-proofness, or envy-freeness, the extent to which individuals have incentives to migrate to other environments is explored. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D50, D60.
AB - Fair division rules are examined in a framework consisting of local environments with fixed, non-disposable, perfectly divisible endowments, and (possibly) different division rules. Individuals have single-peaked preferences and are free to choose the environments where they live. Given that the rules satisfy various desirable properties such as efficiency, strategy-proofness, or envy-freeness, the extent to which individuals have incentives to migrate to other environments is explored. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D50, D60.
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U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1996.0039
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1996.0039
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0030117107
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 69
SP - 104
EP - 116
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -