(De)centralized governance and the value of platform-based new ventures: The moderating role of teams and transparency

Pierluigi Martino, Tom Vanacker, Igor Filatotchev, Cristiano Bellavitis

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Drawing on institutional and demand-side perspectives, we investigate performance implications of (de)centralized governance modes in platform-based new ventures, and the conditions under which (de)centralization generates more value. Using a sample of 1,431 Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), a new source of entrepreneurial finance, we find that centralization of decision-making is positively associated with platforms’ market value. Further, we consider how platform characteristics affect this relationship, finding that both the presence of an experienced Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and project transparency negatively moderate the positive relationship between centralization and market value. Thus, decentralized platforms need leaders with technical experience and project transparency to generate more value. Overall, this study provides a better understanding of the boundary conditions that increase the value of (de)centralized governance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalSmall Business Economics
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - 2024
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Decentralization
  • Demand-side theory
  • Entrepreneurial finance
  • G10
  • G23
  • G30
  • Initial Coin Offerings
  • L26
  • M13
  • Platform governance
  • Platform performance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Business, Management and Accounting
  • Economics and Econometrics

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