TY - GEN
T1 - Convergence of true cooperations in Bayesian reputation game
AU - Lee, Jooyoung
AU - Oh, Jae C.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 IEEE.
PY - 2015/1/15
Y1 - 2015/1/15
N2 - In a distributed environment in which multiple self-interested entities interact, knowing who to interact with is an important decision to make. Reputation is one metric to help with the decision. However, when there are a massive number of entities, a centralized reputation management doesn't scale up. We introduce bayesian reputation game where players have only private information about others with no centralized management. We design a game in a way that the reputation values are used as a part of payoffs and analyze the game when it is infinitely repeated. We define two types of interactions where one is honest and the other is dishonest. We show that the true cooperation is sustained when the game is repeated even when we applied dynamic type changes. As a result, the average reputation values of players increase over time and converge. The game models the real world situation well and it provides a guideline for designing distributed entities from software agents to Internet of things where no centralized authority exists.
AB - In a distributed environment in which multiple self-interested entities interact, knowing who to interact with is an important decision to make. Reputation is one metric to help with the decision. However, when there are a massive number of entities, a centralized reputation management doesn't scale up. We introduce bayesian reputation game where players have only private information about others with no centralized management. We design a game in a way that the reputation values are used as a part of payoffs and analyze the game when it is infinitely repeated. We define two types of interactions where one is honest and the other is dishonest. We show that the true cooperation is sustained when the game is repeated even when we applied dynamic type changes. As a result, the average reputation values of players increase over time and converge. The game models the real world situation well and it provides a guideline for designing distributed entities from software agents to Internet of things where no centralized authority exists.
KW - Bayesian game theory
KW - Cooperation
KW - Infinitely repeated games
KW - Reputation games
KW - Trust
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84923033837&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84923033837&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TrustCom.2014.61
DO - 10.1109/TrustCom.2014.61
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84923033837
T3 - Proceedings - 2014 IEEE 13th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2014
SP - 487
EP - 494
BT - Proceedings - 2014 IEEE 13th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2014
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 13th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2014
Y2 - 24 September 2014 through 26 September 2014
ER -