Convergence of true cooperations in Bayesian reputation game

Jooyoung Lee, Jae C. Oh

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a distributed environment in which multiple self-interested entities interact, knowing who to interact with is an important decision to make. Reputation is one metric to help with the decision. However, when there are a massive number of entities, a centralized reputation management doesn't scale up. We introduce bayesian reputation game where players have only private information about others with no centralized management. We design a game in a way that the reputation values are used as a part of payoffs and analyze the game when it is infinitely repeated. We define two types of interactions where one is honest and the other is dishonest. We show that the true cooperation is sustained when the game is repeated even when we applied dynamic type changes. As a result, the average reputation values of players increase over time and converge. The game models the real world situation well and it provides a guideline for designing distributed entities from software agents to Internet of things where no centralized authority exists.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2014 IEEE 13th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2014
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages487-494
Number of pages8
ISBN (Electronic)9781479965137
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 15 2015
Event13th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2014 - Beijing, China
Duration: Sep 24 2014Sep 26 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2014 IEEE 13th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2014

Other

Other13th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, TrustCom 2014
CountryChina
CityBeijing
Period9/24/149/26/14

Keywords

  • Bayesian game theory
  • Cooperation
  • Infinitely repeated games
  • Reputation games
  • Trust

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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