Continuous-valued social choice

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


Let Φ be any social choice correspondence satisfying a mild continuity condition in addition to independence of unfeasible alternatives (which requires the correspondence to select the same set of alternatives in two situations if the feasible sets are identical in the two situations and, for each individual, the restriction of the preference ordering to the feasible set is the same) and Arrow's choice axiom (which generalizes transitivity). If the society is finite or countably infinite, then Φ is constant, or dictatorial, or inversely dictatorial, even if the agenda domain is restricted. (The outcome space is normal, connected, and first-countable.).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)195-211
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1996


  • Arrow's choice axion
  • Completely dictatorial
  • Continuity
  • Independence of unfeasible alternatives
  • Social choice correspondence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics


Dive into the research topics of 'Continuous-valued social choice'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this