TY - JOUR
T1 - Components of optimal price under logit demand
AU - Basu, Amiya
AU - Mazumdar, Tridib
AU - Raj, S. P.
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors wish to thank Professors Donald Lehmann, Jeffrey Prince, and David Soberman, an anonymous reviewer of EJOR, and the participants of the Johnson School of Management Marketing Workshop at Cornell University for valuable comments. Basu and Mazumdar gratefully acknowledge a grant from the Robert H. Brethen Operations Management Institute at the Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University.
PY - 2007/11/1
Y1 - 2007/11/1
N2 - Demand for durables can be modeled using a logit framework in which a customer chooses one brand from several alternatives, or buys nothing at all. In this framework, optimal prices for competing brands can be expressed as a system of non-linear equations, which, however, do not have closed form solutions. Although the optimal price can be determined by numerical search, the solution offers limited understanding of its components. In this article, we develop a linear approximation of the Nash equilibrium optimal price of a brand as its marginal cost plus a weighted sum of: (1) the inverse of the price sensitivity of the market, (2) the average value added by all brands in the market, and (3) the value advantage (or disadvantage) of the brand. The weights depend primarily upon the number of competing brands, with price insensitivity having the strongest impact, followed by value advantage of the brand, and average value added by all brands. This approximation for optimal price is found to be robust under a wide range of conditions. Additionally, we demonstrate that using the approximation results in only marginal deviation of profits from the theoretical Nash optimal.
AB - Demand for durables can be modeled using a logit framework in which a customer chooses one brand from several alternatives, or buys nothing at all. In this framework, optimal prices for competing brands can be expressed as a system of non-linear equations, which, however, do not have closed form solutions. Although the optimal price can be determined by numerical search, the solution offers limited understanding of its components. In this article, we develop a linear approximation of the Nash equilibrium optimal price of a brand as its marginal cost plus a weighted sum of: (1) the inverse of the price sensitivity of the market, (2) the average value added by all brands in the market, and (3) the value advantage (or disadvantage) of the brand. The weights depend primarily upon the number of competing brands, with price insensitivity having the strongest impact, followed by value advantage of the brand, and average value added by all brands. This approximation for optimal price is found to be robust under a wide range of conditions. Additionally, we demonstrate that using the approximation results in only marginal deviation of profits from the theoretical Nash optimal.
KW - Logit models of competition
KW - Marketing
KW - Pricing
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U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.09.089
DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.09.089
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:34248208588
SN - 0377-2217
VL - 182
SP - 1084
EP - 1106
JO - European Journal of Operational Research
JF - European Journal of Operational Research
IS - 3
ER -