Choosing "Flawed" aggregation rules: The benefit of social choice violations in a league that values competitive balance

James W. Boudreau, Shane Sanders

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Revealed demand for competitive balance in sports leagues is well-established across many settings. The present study considers the role of aggregation rules (e.g., those that use aggregate individual performances to establish a set of team scores) in sports and other competitive environments. We find that competitive balance and uncertainty of outcome are minimized for aggregation rules that preserve the social choice principles of transitivity and independence. A league that values competitive balance should therefore prefer aggregation rules that violate these social choice principles. Such a preference for ambiguity may not be costless, however, as it may entail important distributional implications for teams, managers, and coaches.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)106-108
Number of pages3
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume137
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Competitive balance
  • Social choice
  • Sport
  • Uncertainty

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Choosing "Flawed" aggregation rules: The benefit of social choice violations in a league that values competitive balance'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this