Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

Fasil Alemante; Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1007/s00199-015-0930-7

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

Fasil Alemante, Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

The resolute domain of a social choice correspondence is the set of profiles at which only one alternative is selected. The Condorcet, plurality, approval voting, and maximin correspondences—restricted to their respective resolute domains—satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and a strong monotonicity condition, but are not characterized by those three conditions. We present examples illustrating this and provide additional conditions that do suffice for characterization.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	765-783
Number of pages	19
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	62
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0930-7
State	Published - Oct 1 2016

Keywords

Anonymity
Approval voting
Condorcet
Lower invariance
Maximin
Monotonicity
Neutrality
Plurality voting
Resolute domain
Social choice correspondence
Social choice function
Upper invariance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-015-0930-7

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AU - Campbell, Donald E.

AU - Kelly, Jerry S.

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N2 - The resolute domain of a social choice correspondence is the set of profiles at which only one alternative is selected. The Condorcet, plurality, approval voting, and maximin correspondences—restricted to their respective resolute domains—satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and a strong monotonicity condition, but are not characterized by those three conditions. We present examples illustrating this and provide additional conditions that do suffice for characterization.

AB - The resolute domain of a social choice correspondence is the set of profiles at which only one alternative is selected. The Condorcet, plurality, approval voting, and maximin correspondences—restricted to their respective resolute domains—satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and a strong monotonicity condition, but are not characterized by those three conditions. We present examples illustrating this and provide additional conditions that do suffice for characterization.

KW - Anonymity

KW - Approval voting

KW - Condorcet

KW - Lower invariance

KW - Maximin

KW - Monotonicity

KW - Neutrality

KW - Plurality voting

KW - Resolute domain

KW - Social choice correspondence

KW - Social choice function

KW - Upper invariance

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JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

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ER -

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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