Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

Fasil Alemante, Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

The resolute domain of a social choice correspondence is the set of profiles at which only one alternative is selected. The Condorcet, plurality, approval voting, and maximin correspondences—restricted to their respective resolute domains—satisfy anonymity, neutrality, and a strong monotonicity condition, but are not characterized by those three conditions. We present examples illustrating this and provide additional conditions that do suffice for characterization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalEconomic Theory
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Nov 12 2015

Keywords

  • Anonymity
  • Approval voting
  • Condorcet
  • Lower invariance
  • Maximin
  • Monotonicity
  • Neutrality
  • Plurality voting
  • Resolute domain
  • Social choice correspondence
  • Social choice function
  • Upper invariance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this