TY - JOUR
T1 - Can personality traits be inferred automatically? Spontaneous inferences require cognitive capacity at encoding
AU - Uleman, James S.
AU - Newman, Leonard
AU - Winter, Laraine
N1 - Funding Information:
Preparation of this article was supported in part by National Institute of Mental Health Grant MH 43959 to James S. Uleman. We thank John Bargh for his helpful suggestions on the probe RT measure; Mary DiBenedetto, Ann Gildea, Alexandra Barrocas, and Mark DiTaranto for assistance in running subjects; Bert Holland for help with data analyses; and Eliot Smith and several anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
PY - 1992/3
Y1 - 1992/3
N2 - Previous research showed that people can make trait inferences from single behaviors described in sentences, without either intentions to do so or awareness of having done so. This suggested that these inferences might be automatic. By definition, "automatic" cognitive processes occur without intentions or awareness, without effort, and without using capacity-limited cognitive processing resources. Winter, Uleman, and Cunniff (1985) attempted to manipulate available cognitive capacity by varying the difficulty of the concurrent cognitive task. This did not affect unintended trait inferences, suggesting that these are automatic by this criterion. But they had no direct measure of available cognitive capacity. In the present study, we added a probe reaction time measure of capacity to their procedure and extended the range of task difficulties. Earlier findings of trait inferences without intentions or awareness were replicated, but there was also evidence that the concurrent task interfered with the trait inference process. Hence, although trait inferences can be "spontaneous" (occurring without intentions or awareness), subjectively effortless, and difficult to disrupt with a concurrent task, they are not entirely automatic because they do use capacity-limited resources. These results also confirm that the cued-recall evidence for spontaneous trait inferences reflects important encoding and not merely retrieval phenomena.
AB - Previous research showed that people can make trait inferences from single behaviors described in sentences, without either intentions to do so or awareness of having done so. This suggested that these inferences might be automatic. By definition, "automatic" cognitive processes occur without intentions or awareness, without effort, and without using capacity-limited cognitive processing resources. Winter, Uleman, and Cunniff (1985) attempted to manipulate available cognitive capacity by varying the difficulty of the concurrent cognitive task. This did not affect unintended trait inferences, suggesting that these are automatic by this criterion. But they had no direct measure of available cognitive capacity. In the present study, we added a probe reaction time measure of capacity to their procedure and extended the range of task difficulties. Earlier findings of trait inferences without intentions or awareness were replicated, but there was also evidence that the concurrent task interfered with the trait inference process. Hence, although trait inferences can be "spontaneous" (occurring without intentions or awareness), subjectively effortless, and difficult to disrupt with a concurrent task, they are not entirely automatic because they do use capacity-limited resources. These results also confirm that the cued-recall evidence for spontaneous trait inferences reflects important encoding and not merely retrieval phenomena.
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U2 - 10.1016/1053-8100(92)90049-G
DO - 10.1016/1053-8100(92)90049-G
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:38249015700
SN - 1053-8100
VL - 1
SP - 77
EP - 90
JO - Consciousness and Cognition
JF - Consciousness and Cognition
IS - 1
ER -