Campaign finance legislation and the supply-side of the revolving door

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Existing research on the revolving door examines why employers hire former politicians. I complement this demand-side approach by demonstrating the importance of the supply-side. In particular, I argue that one important institutional factor that shapes politicians' willingness to leave office for a private sector job is campaign finance legislation. Less restrictive rules increase campaign spending for incumbents, which makes revolving door employment less attractive. Empirically, I use novel data from the US states and a difference-in-differences design to show that the exogenous removal of campaign finance legislation through Citizens United reduced the probability that incumbents left office to work as lobbyists. The supply-side approach provides insights into comparative differences in the prevalence of the revolving door.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)365-379
Number of pages15
JournalPolitical Science Research and Methods
Volume9
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 2021

Keywords

  • American politics
  • comparative politics: political institutions
  • legislative politics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

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