TY - JOUR
T1 - Bias in confidence
T2 - A critical test for discrete-state models of change detection.
AU - Winiger, Samuel
AU - Singmann, Henrik
AU - Kellen, David
N1 - Funding Information:
Swiss National Science Foundation
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 American Psychological Association
PY - 2021/3
Y1 - 2021/3
N2 - Ongoing discussions on the nature of storage in visual working memory have mostly focused on 2 theoretical accounts: On one hand we have a discrete-state account, postulating that information in working memory is supported with high fidelity for a limited number of discrete items by a given number of “slots,” with no information being retained beyond these. In contrast with this all-or-nothing view, we have a continuous account arguing that information can be degraded in a continuous manner, reflecting the amount of resources dedicated to each item. It turns out that the core tenets of this discrete-state account constrain the way individuals can express confidence in their judgments, excluding the possibility of biased confidence judgments. Importantly, these biased judgments are expected when assuming a continuous degradation of information. We report 2 studies showing that biased confidence judgments can be reliably observed, a behavioral signature that rejects a large number of discrete-state models. Finally, complementary modeling analyses support the notion of a mixture account, according to which memory-based confidence judgments (in contrast with guesses) are based on a comparison between graded, fallible representations, and response criteria. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved)
AB - Ongoing discussions on the nature of storage in visual working memory have mostly focused on 2 theoretical accounts: On one hand we have a discrete-state account, postulating that information in working memory is supported with high fidelity for a limited number of discrete items by a given number of “slots,” with no information being retained beyond these. In contrast with this all-or-nothing view, we have a continuous account arguing that information can be degraded in a continuous manner, reflecting the amount of resources dedicated to each item. It turns out that the core tenets of this discrete-state account constrain the way individuals can express confidence in their judgments, excluding the possibility of biased confidence judgments. Importantly, these biased judgments are expected when assuming a continuous degradation of information. We report 2 studies showing that biased confidence judgments can be reliably observed, a behavioral signature that rejects a large number of discrete-state models. Finally, complementary modeling analyses support the notion of a mixture account, according to which memory-based confidence judgments (in contrast with guesses) are based on a comparison between graded, fallible representations, and response criteria. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved)
KW - change detection
KW - confidence
KW - critical test
KW - discrete-state models
KW - visual working memory
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U2 - 10.1037/xlm0000959
DO - 10.1037/xlm0000959
M3 - Article
C2 - 33030942
AN - SCOPUS:85092601376
SN - 0278-7393
VL - 47
SP - 387
EP - 401
JO - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition
JF - Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition
IS - 3
ER -