Abstract
Arrow proved that a social welfare function with transitive values cannot simultaneously satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto criterion, and non-dictatorship. We use asymptotic density to determine bounds on the trade-off between violations of the Pareto criterion and violations of non-dictatorship when the set X of outcomes is countably infinite.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 181-194 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | Mathematical social sciences |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 1995 |
Keywords
- Asymptotic density
- Non-dictatorship
- Pareto
- Trade-off
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- General Social Sciences
- General Psychology
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty