Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009

Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	79-82
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	128
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009
State	Published - Mar 1 2015

Keywords

Anonymity
Condorcet
Neutrality
Social choice rules
Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009

Cite this

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title = "Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain",

abstract = "The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.",

keywords = "Anonymity, Condorcet, Neutrality, Social choice rules, Strategy-proofness",

author = "Campbell, {Donald E.} and Kelly, {Jerry S.}",

note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier B.V.",

year = "2015",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009",

language = "English (US)",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

AU - Campbell, Donald E.

AU - Kelly, Jerry S.

PY - 2015/3/1

Y1 - 2015/3/1

N2 - The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.

AB - The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.

KW - Anonymity

KW - Condorcet

KW - Neutrality

KW - Social choice rules

KW - Strategy-proofness

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.009

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84922711545

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 128

SP - 79

EP - 82

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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