Anonymous, neutral, and strategy-proof rules on the Condorcet domain

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

The Condorcet rule on the domain of profiles at which there exists a unique Condorcet winner is the unique rule satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)79-82
Number of pages4
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume128
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2015

Keywords

  • Anonymity
  • Condorcet
  • Neutrality
  • Social choice rules
  • Strategy-proofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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