Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.028

Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

8 Scopus citations

Abstract

Anonymity and neutrality conflict if the number of individuals is even and a single alternative is selected. Limited neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity imply majority rule when the agenda is a two-element set.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	10-12
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	118
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.028
State	Published - Jan 2013

Keywords

Anonymity
Monotonicity
Neutrality
Social choice function

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.028

Cite this

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title = "Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda",

abstract = "Anonymity and neutrality conflict if the number of individuals is even and a single alternative is selected. Limited neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity imply majority rule when the agenda is a two-element set.",

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KW - Neutrality

KW - Social choice function

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Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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