TY - GEN
T1 - An auction-based mechanism for dynamic spectrum allocation in participatory cognitive radio networks
AU - Nadendla, V. Sriram Siddhardh
AU - Brahma, Swastik
AU - Varshney, Pramod K.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - The problem of dynamic spectrum allocation for participatory cognitive radio (CR) networks is modeled using an auction-based mechanism, where the fusion center (FC) acts as an auctioneer and allocates spectrum to CRs without complete knowledge regarding spectrum availability. We also consider the cost of collisions with the primary user (PU) and assign this cost to the FC, making it completely responsible for its allocation decision. With the help of CRs participating in the network, the FC makes a global inference on the availability of the spectrum followed by spectrum allocation. The goal of this paper is to investigate the design of an optimal auction-based framework for participatory CR networks, and to find the conditions under which a CR actively participates in the optimal auction (or, collaborative spectrum sensing). We also identify a scenario in the optimal auction design where the FC pays to the participating CRs, in order to improve the sensing performance, while simultaneously maximizing its revenue.
AB - The problem of dynamic spectrum allocation for participatory cognitive radio (CR) networks is modeled using an auction-based mechanism, where the fusion center (FC) acts as an auctioneer and allocates spectrum to CRs without complete knowledge regarding spectrum availability. We also consider the cost of collisions with the primary user (PU) and assign this cost to the FC, making it completely responsible for its allocation decision. With the help of CRs participating in the network, the FC makes a global inference on the availability of the spectrum followed by spectrum allocation. The goal of this paper is to investigate the design of an optimal auction-based framework for participatory CR networks, and to find the conditions under which a CR actively participates in the optimal auction (or, collaborative spectrum sensing). We also identify a scenario in the optimal auction design where the FC pays to the participating CRs, in order to improve the sensing performance, while simultaneously maximizing its revenue.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84875755225&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/Allerton.2012.6483484
DO - 10.1109/Allerton.2012.6483484
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84875755225
SN - 9781467345385
T3 - 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012
SP - 2120
EP - 2126
BT - 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012
T2 - 2012 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2012
Y2 - 1 October 2012 through 5 October 2012
ER -