Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't

Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

52 Scopus citations

Abstract

Explores, for several classes of social choice rules, the distribution of the number of profiles at which a rule can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we will do comparative social choice, looking for information about how social choice rules compare in their vulnerability to strategic misrepresentation of preferences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)161-175
Number of pages15
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume10
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 1993

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this