Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't

Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1007/BF00183344

Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't

Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

65 Scopus citations

Abstract

Explores, for several classes of social choice rules, the distribution of the number of profiles at which a rule can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we will do comparative social choice, looking for information about how social choice rules compare in their vulnerability to strategic misrepresentation of preferences.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	161-175
Number of pages	15
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	10
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00183344
State	Published - Apr 1993

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/BF00183344

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Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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