Agency Problems, Information Asymmetries, and Convertible Debt Security Design

Craig M. Lewis, Richard J. Rogalski, James K. Seward

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper proposes and implements a security design framework to assess why corporate managers issue convertible debt. We examine three theories that make predictions about the design of convertible debt. Our results suggest that some issuers design convertible debt to mitigate asset substitution problems, while others design it to reduce adverse selection problems. We also find that issuers vary convertible debt security design over the business cycle in response to time variation in asset substitution and adverse selection problems. Overall, the results indicate that corporate managers actively alter convertible debt security design to mitigate costly external finance problems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G32

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)32-59
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Financial Intermediation
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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