Abelian symmetry groups in social choice

Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(92)90022-W

Abelian symmetry groups in social choice

Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

For every finite abelian group G there exists (i) a social choice rule f for which the group of permutations of individuals leaving f unchanged is isomorphic to G; and (ii) a social choice rule g for which the group of permutations of alternatives leaving g unchanged is isomorphic to G.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	15-25
Number of pages	11
Journal	Mathematical social sciences
Volume	25
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(92)90022-W
State	Published - Dec 1992

Keywords

Abelian groups
social choice
symmetry

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
General Social Sciences
General Psychology
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1016/0165-4896(92)90022-W

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KW - symmetry

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Abelian symmetry groups in social choice

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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