Abstract
For every finite abelian group G there exists (i) a social choice rule f for which the group of permutations of individuals leaving f unchanged is isomorphic to G; and (ii) a social choice rule g for which the group of permutations of alternatives leaving g unchanged is isomorphic to G.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 15-25 |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Journal | Mathematical Social Sciences |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 1992 |
Keywords
- Abelian groups
- social choice
- symmetry
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Social Sciences(all)
- Psychology(all)
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty