Abelian symmetry groups in social choice

Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

For every finite abelian group G there exists (i) a social choice rule f for which the group of permutations of individuals leaving f unchanged is isomorphic to G; and (ii) a social choice rule g for which the group of permutations of alternatives leaving g unchanged is isomorphic to G.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)15-25
Number of pages11
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume25
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1992

Fingerprint

Social Choice
Symmetry Group
Abelian group
Permutation
Isomorphic
Finite Abelian Groups
Group
Alternatives
Social choice
Symmetry group
Social choice rule

Keywords

  • Abelian groups
  • social choice
  • symmetry

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Abelian symmetry groups in social choice. / Kelly, Jerry S.

In: Mathematical Social Sciences, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1992, p. 15-25.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kelly, Jerry S. / Abelian symmetry groups in social choice. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. 1992 ; Vol. 25, No. 1. pp. 15-25.
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