A trade-off result for preference revelation

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00037-3

A trade-off result for preference revelation

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

If the social choice rule g selects from one up to k alternatives (but not more), then there exists a coalition H of k individuals such that for each profile r, the choice set g(r) is the collection of the top-most alternatives in the orderings of the individuals in H. Consequently, g is independent of the preferences of individuals not in H, forcing a disagreeable trade-off: Either some choice sets are very large, or most individuals never have any say in the social choice.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	129-141
Number of pages	13
Journal	Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume	34
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00037-3
State	Published - Aug 2000

Keywords

Preference
Social choice
Trade-off

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00037-3

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A trade-off result for preference revelation

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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