A trade-off result for preference revelation

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

If the social choice rule g selects from one up to k alternatives (but not more), then there exists a coalition H of k individuals such that for each profile r, the choice set g(r) is the collection of the top-most alternatives in the orderings of the individuals in H. Consequently, g is independent of the preferences of individuals not in H, forcing a disagreeable trade-off: Either some choice sets are very large, or most individuals never have any say in the social choice.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)129-141
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume34
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 2000

Keywords

  • Preference
  • Social choice
  • Trade-off

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Applied Mathematics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A trade-off result for preference revelation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this