A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let ℒC (resp., ℘C) denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain ℒ C, and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain ℘C.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)557-568
Number of pages12
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume22
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2003

Keywords

  • Condorcet
  • Majority winner
  • Strategy-proof

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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