### Abstract

A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let ℒ_{C} (resp., ℘_{C}) denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain ℒ _{C}, and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain ℘_{C}.

Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 557-568 |

Number of pages | 12 |

Journal | Economic Theory |

Volume | 22 |

Issue number | 3 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Oct 1 2003 |

### Keywords

- Condorcet
- Majority winner
- Strategy-proof

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Economics and Econometrics

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## Cite this

Campbell, D. E., & Kelly, J. S. (2003). A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule.

*Economic Theory*,*22*(3), 557-568. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1