A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly

doi:10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1

A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let ℒ_C (resp., ℘_C) denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain ℒ _C, and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain ℘_C.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	557-568
Number of pages	12
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	22
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1
State	Published - Oct 2003

Keywords

Condorcet
Majority winner
Strategy-proof

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s00199-002-0344-1

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AB - A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let ℒC (resp., ℘C) denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with domain ℒ C, and majority rule is the only strategy-proof rule with domain ℘C.

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KW - Strategy-proof

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A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule

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Keywords

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