A rationality-based modeling for coalition support

Jae C. Oh, Nathaniel Gemelli, Robert Wright

Research output: Chapter in Book/Entry/PoemConference contribution

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We present a game theoretic model for multi-agent resource distribution and allocation where agents in the environment must help each other to survive. Each agent maintains a set of twotuples T = (A, P) called friendship values representing actual friendship and perceived friendship. The model directly addresses problems in reputation management schemes in multi-agent systems and Peer-to-Peer distributed systems. We present algorithms for maintaining the friendship values as well as a utility equation used in each agent's decision making. For an application problem, we adapted our formal model to the military coalition support problem in peace-keeping missions. Simulation results show that efficient resource allocation and sharing with minimum communication cost is achieved without centralized control. Keywords: War games, Rational agents, Game Theory

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - HIS'04
Subtitle of host publication4th International Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems
EditorsM. Ishikawa, S. Hashimoto, M. Paprzycki, E. Barakova, K. Yoshida, M. Koppen, D.M. Corne, A. Abraham
Pages172-177
Number of pages6
StatePublished - 2005
EventProceedings - HIS'04: 4th International Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems - Kitakyushu, Japan
Duration: Dec 5 2004Dec 8 2004

Publication series

NameProceedings - HIS'04: 4th International Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems

Other

OtherProceedings - HIS'04: 4th International Conference on Hybrid Intelligent Systems
Country/TerritoryJapan
CityKitakyushu
Period12/5/0412/8/04

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Engineering

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