A look at firmg-regulator exchanges: Friendly enough or too friendly?

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article examines the relational characteristics of firmg-regulator interactions. Many political economists have focused on the relevance, costs, processes, and beneficiaries of regulation. Alternatively, most management researchers treat regulation as one of many environmental factors firms must consider in developing strategy. This article extends management research by examining the subjective, relational components of firmg-regulator interactions. Using social exchange and relational governance theories, hypotheses are developed to examine how firms' interactions with their regulators affect both the frequency with which they are monitored and the evaluation they receive. A within-industry (i.e., banking), within-region (i.e., the Northeast) sample is used to examine the relational characteristics of firmg-regulator interactions concerning the Community Reinvestment Act. The results indicate that relational characteristics explain a significant amount of incremental variance in predicting the frequency of monitoring and evaluation, over that explained by objective measures and prior performance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)147-178
Number of pages32
JournalBusiness and Society
Volume48
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2009

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interaction
firm
regulation
reinvestment
evaluation
management
banking
economist
environmental factors
governance
monitoring
Interaction
industry
costs
community
performance
Economists
Incremental
Banking industry
Environmental factors

Keywords

  • Regulator-firm relations
  • Relational governance
  • Social exchange
  • Strategic management

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)

Cite this

A look at firmg-regulator exchanges : Friendly enough or too friendly? / Reed, Kira.

In: Business and Society, Vol. 48, No. 2, 06.2009, p. 147-178.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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