A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

We characterize strategy-proof social choice procedures when choice sets need not be singletons. Sets are compared by leximin. For a strategy-proof rule g, there is a positive integer k such that either (i) the choice sets g(r) for all profiles r have the same cardinality k and there is an individual i such that g(r) is the set of alternatives that are the k highest ranking in i's preference ordering, or (ii) all sets of cardinality 1 to k are chosen and there is a coalition L of cardinality k such that g(r) is the union of the tops for the individuals in L. There do not exist any strategy-proof rules such that the choice sets are all of cardinality to k where .

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)809-829
Number of pages21
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume20
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2002

Keywords

  • Leximin
  • Non-resolute
  • Strategy-proof

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A leximin characterization of strategy-proof and non-resolute social choice procedures'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this