Abstract
We characterize strategy-proof social choice procedures when choice sets need not be singletons. Sets are compared by leximin. For a strategy-proof rule g, there is a positive integer k such that either (i) the choice sets g(r) for all profiles r have the same cardinality k and there is an individual i such that g(r) is the set of alternatives that are the k highest ranking in i's preference ordering, or (ii) all sets of cardinality 1 to k are chosen and there is a coalition L of cardinality k such that g(r) is the union of the tops for the individuals in L. There do not exist any strategy-proof rules such that the choice sets are all of cardinality to k where .
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 809-829 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 20 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2002 |
Keywords
- Leximin
- Non-resolute
- Strategy-proof
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics