A Game Theoretic power control framework for spectrum sharing in competitive environments

Raghed El-Bardan, Swastik Brahma, Pramod K. Varshney

Research output: Chapter in Book/Entry/PoemConference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents a Game Theoretic framework for the analysis of distributed spectrum sharing in a Cognitive Radio Network (CRN). We consider competitive interactions among selfish secondary users (SUs) under realistic physical interference constraints. Subject to a per-user average power budget, SUs choose their transmission powers with the objective of satisfying minimum signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) constraints at the intended receivers. We investigate self-enforcing spectrum sharing strategies of the SUs which correspond to Nash Equilibria (NE) points in a single shot scenario. We carry out an equilibrium analysis by considering the mixed strategy space and provide closed form expressions of the equilibria points. Numerical examples are further presented for illustration.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationConference Record of the 47th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages1493-1497
Number of pages5
ISBN (Print)9781479923908
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event2013 47th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers - Pacific Grove, CA, United States
Duration: Nov 3 2013Nov 6 2013

Publication series

NameConference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
ISSN (Print)1058-6393

Other

Other2013 47th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPacific Grove, CA
Period11/3/1311/6/13

Keywords

  • Cognitive radio network
  • Game theory
  • Power control
  • Spectrum sharing

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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