A Democracy principle and strategy-proofness

Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In some social choice applications we want more than one alternative to be selected in some situations. This allows the construction of strategy-proof social choice rules that are not dictatorial. But if we also require x alone to be selected if it is at the top of some ordering that is submitted by more than half of the individuals then the rule cannot be strategy-proof. We prove this for rules that sometimes select one alternative, and sometimes two, but never more than two.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)465-473
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Public Economic Theory
Volume1
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 1999

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics

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